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Abstract. Block cipher ARIA was first proposed by some South Korean experts in 2003, and later,
it was established as a Korean Standard block cipher algorithm by Korean Agency for Technology
and Standards. In this paper, we focus on the security evaluation of ARIA block cipher against
the recent zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. In addition, Partial-sum technique and FFT (Fast
Fourier Transform) technique are used to speed up the cryptanalysis, respectively.
We first introduce some 4-round linear approximations of ARIA with zero-correlation, and then
present some key-recovery attacks on 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 with Partial-sum technique and
FFT technique. The key-recovery attack with Partial-sum technique on 6-round ARIA-128 needs
2123.6 known plaintexts (KPs), 2121 encryptions and 290.3 bytes memory, and the attack with FFT
technique requires 2124.1 KPs, 2121.5 encryptions and 290.3 bytes memory. Moreover, applying
Partial-sum technique, we can attack 7-round ARIA-256 with 2124.6 KPs, 2203.5 encryptions and
2152 bytes memory and 7-round ARIA-256 employing FFT technique, requires 2124.7 KPs, 2209.5
encryptions and 2152 bytes memory. Our results are the first zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
results on ARIA.
Keywords: ARIA, Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, Partial-sum, FFT, Cryptography.
1 Introduction
ARIA [1] is a block cipher designed by a group of Korean experts in 2003. In 2004, ARIA
was established as a Korean Standard block cipher algorithm by the Ministry of Commerce,
Industry and Energy. ARIA is a general-purpose involutional SPN(substitution permutation
network) block cipher algorithm, optimized for both lightweight environments and hardware
implementation. ARIA supports 128-bit block length with the key sizes of 128/192/256
bits, and the most interesting characteristic is its involution based on the special usage of
neighbouring confusion layer and involutional diffusion layer.
The security of ARIA has been internally evaluated by the designers [1] with differential
cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, truncated differential cryptanalysis, impossible differential
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2Attack Type key size Rounds Date Time Source
Truncated Differential 128 7 281 CPs 281 Enc [2]
Impossible Differential 128 6 2121 CPs 2121 Enc [3]
Impossible Differential 192 7 2127 CPs 2176.2 Enc [9]
Impossible Differential 256 7 2125 CPs 2238 Enc [8]
Meet-in-Middle 192 7 2120 KPs 2185.3 Enc [7]
Boombrang 192 6 257 CPs 2171.2 Enc [5]
Integral 128 6 299.2 CPs 274.1 Enc [6]
Integral 256 7 2100.6 CPs 2225.8 Enc [6]
ZC.Partial-sum 128 6 2123.6 KPs 2121 Enc Sect.4.1
ZC.FFT 128 6 2124.1 KPs 2121.5 Enc Sect.4.2
ZC.Partial-sum 256 7 2124.6 KPs 2203.5 Enc Sect.5.1
ZC.FFT 256 7 2124.7 KPs 2209.5 Enc Sect.5.2
KP(CP) refer to the number of known(chosen) plaintexts, Enc refers to the number of encryptions.
Table 1: Summary of the main attacks on ARIA
cryptanalysis, higher order differential cryptanalysis, square attack and interpolation attack.
Biryukov et al.[2] performed an evaluation of ARIA with truncated differential cryptanalysis
and dedicated linear cryptanalysis. For the first time, Wu et al. [3] found a non-trivial 4-
round impossible differentials and they gave a attack on 6-round ARIA requiring about 2121
chosen plaintexts and 2112 encryptions. Based on some properties of the binary matrix used
in the diffusion layer, Li et al.[4] found some new 4-round impossible differentials of ARIA,
and they gave an efficient attack on 6-round ARIA. Later, Fleischmann et al.[5] proposed
the boomerang attack on 6-round ARIA and the integral attack [6] was introduced in the
analysis of 7-round ARIA. Tang et al.[7] proposed the meet-in-the-middle attack on 7-round
ARIA. Du et al.[8] proposed the impossible differentials on 7-round ARIA-256 and recently,
Xie et al.[9] gave some improvements. Attack results on ARIA are summarized in Table 1.
Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis [10] was proposed by Bogdanov and Rijmen, which
has its theoretical foundation in the availability of numerous key-independent unbiased linear
approximations with correlation zero for many ciphers. However, the initial distinguisher of
[10] had some limitations in terms of data complexity, which needs at least half of the code-
book. In FSE 2012, Bogdanov and Wang [11] proposed a more data-efficient distinguisher
by making use of multiple linear approximations with zero-correlation. Although the date
complexity is reduced, the distinguisher relies on the assumption that all linear approxi-
mations with zero-correlation are independent. At AsiaCrypt 2012[12], a multidimensional
distinguisher has been constructed for the zero-correlation property, which removed the un-
necessary independency assumptions. Recently, zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis has been
using in the attack of block ciphers CAST-256[12], Camellia[13], CLEFIA[13], HIGHT[14],
3LBlock[15] and E2[16], successfully.
Some improving techniques for zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis have been proposed,
such as the partial-sum technique and FFT technique. Ferguson et al. [17] proposed the
partial-sum technique in 2000 and they applied the technique to the integral attacks on 6-
round AES. The basic idea of Partial-sum technique is to partially compute the sum by guess-
ing each key one after another instead of guessing the all keys one time. Since zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis use enormous plaintexts-ciphertexts pairs, Partial-sum technique can also
be used to reduce the computation complexity in the attack procedure.
FFT-based technique of computational complexity reduction was first proposed by Col-
lard et al.[18] in the linear attack on the AES candidate Serpent in 2007. It also relies on
eliminating the redundant computations from the partial encryption/decryption in attack
process. At SAC 2013, Bogdanov et al.[13] applied FFT technique to the zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis of Camellia.
In this paper, 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations of ARIA are discussed in de-
tail. Furthermore, we investigate the security of 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 with both Partial-
sum and FFT techniques. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1. We reveal some 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations of ARIA. If we treat
the input/output masks as the input/output differentials, they are 4-round impossible differ-
entials of ARIA owing that the diffusion layer of the round function is a diagonal matrix.
2. Based on those new linear approximations with zero-correlation, key-recovery attacks
on 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 are proposed. In addition, we use Partial-sum technique and
FFT technique to speed up the attacks. To my knowledge, they are the first zero-correlation
linear attacks on reduced-round ARIA.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of block cipher ARIA
and outlines the ideas of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Some new zero-correlation
linear approximations are shown in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 illustrate our attacks
on 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 with Partial-sum and FFT technique, respectively. We conclude
in Section 6.
2 Preliminarise
2.1 Description of ARIA
ARIA is an SPN style block cipher and the number of the rounds are 12/14/16 corresponding
to key of 128/192/256 bits. The round function constitutes 3 basic operations: the substitu-
tion layer, the diffusion layer and the round key addition, which can be described as follows:
Round Key Addition(KA) : This is done by XORing the 128-bit round key, which is
derived from the cipher key by means of the key schedule.
Substitution Layer(SL) : Applying the 8× 8 S-boxes 16 times in parallel on each byte.
There are two types of substitution layers to be used so as to make the cipher involution,
4see Figure 1. For convenience, we denote by Sr,k, S
−1
r,k the k-th S-box of r-th round and its
inverse S-box.
Figure 1: The substitution layer of ARIA
Diffusion Layer(DL) : A linear map P : (F 82 )
16 → (F 82 )16 is given by
(x0, x1, ..., x15)→ (y0, y1, ..., y15),
where 
y0
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
y9
y10
y11
y12
y13
y14
y15

=

0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

·

x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
x13
x14
x15

Note that the diffusion layer of the last round is replaced by a round key addition. We
shall assume that the 6/7-round ARIA also has the diffusion layer replaced by a round key
addition in the attack of 6/7-round ARIA. In addition, our attacks do not utilize the key
relation, we omit the details of ARIA’s key schedule.
2.2 Basic ideas of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
In this section, we briefly recall the basic concepts of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
based on [10], [11] and [12]. Linear cryptanalysis is based on linear approximations determined
by input mask a and output mask β. A linear approximation a → β of a vectorial function
f has a correlation denoted by
C(β · f(x), a · x) = 2Prx(β · f(x)⊕ a · x = 0)− 1,
where we denote the scalar product of binary vectors by a · x = ⊕ni=1aixi.
In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the distinguisher uses linear approximations with
zero correlation for all keys while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes linear approxima-
tions with correlation as far from zero as possible. Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis with
multiple linear approximations was introduced in [11].
5Let the number of available zero-correlation linear approximations for an n-bit block cipher
be denoted by l. Let the number of required known plaintexts be N . For each of the l
given linear approximations, the adversary computes the number Ti of times that linear
approximation i is fulfilled on N plaintexts and ciphertexts, i ∈ {1, ..., l}. Each Ti suggests
an empirical correlation value cˆi = 2Ti/N − 1. Under a statistical independency assumption,∑l
i=0 cˆ
2
i follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ0 = l/N and variance σ20 = 2l/N2 for the
right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X2-distribution with mean µ1 =
l/N+l/2n and standard deviation σ1 =
√
2l/N+
√
2l/2n. If we denote the probability of false
positives and the probability of false negatives to distinguish between a wrong key and a right
key as β1 and β0, respectively, and we consider the decision threshold τ = µ0 + σ0z1−β0 =
µ1 − σ1z1−β1 , then the number of known plaintexts N should be approximately:
N =
2n(z1−β0 + z1−β1)√
l/2− z1−β1
, (1)
where z1−β0 and z1−β1are the respective quantiles of the standard normal distribution.
Recently, Bogdanov et al. [12] proposed a multidimensional zero-correlation linear distin-
guisher using l zero-correlation linear approximations to remove the statistical independency
assumption, which requires O(2n/
√
l) known plaintexts, where n is the block size of a cipher.
We treat the zero-correlation linear approximations available as a linear space spanned
by m base zero-correlation linear approximations such that all l = 2m − 1 non-zero linear
combinations of them have zero correlation. For each of the 2m data values z ∈ Fm2 , the
attacker initializes a counter V [z], z = 0, 1, ..., 2m − 1 to value zero. Then, for each distinct
plaintext, the attacker computes the corresponding data value in Fm2 by evaluating the m
basis linear approximations and increments the counter V [z] of this data value by one. Then
the attacker computes the statistic T :
T =
2m−1∑
i=0
(v[z]−N2−m)2
N2−m(1− 2−m) .
The statistic T follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ0 = (l − 1)2n−N2n−1 and variance σ20 =
2(l − 1)(2n−N2n−1 )2 for the right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X2-
distribution with mean µ1 = l − 1 and variance σ21 = 2(l − 1).
If we denote the probability of false positives and the probability of false negatives to
distinguish between a wrong key and a right key as β0 and β1, respectively, and we consider
the decision threshold τ = µ0 +σ0z1−β0 = µ1−σ1z1−β1 , then the number of known plaintexts
N should be about
N =
(2n − 1)(z1−β0 + z1−β1)√
(l − 1)/2 + z1−β0
+ 1. (2)
6Figure 2: Zero-correlation linear approximations of 4-round ARIA
3 Some zero-correlation linear approximations for 4-round ARIA
In this section, we show some zero-correlation linear approximations for 4-round ARIA, fol-
lowing the properties on the propagation of linear masks over basic block cipher operations
proposed in [10]. We consider the 4-round linear approximations with zero-correlation, which
is built in a miss-in-the-middle manner. Some 2-round linear approximations with nonzero
bias is concatenated to some 2-round linear approximations with nonzero bias in the inverse
direction, where the intermediate masks states contradict with each other.
We assert that the 4-round linear approximations
(0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
4-Round−→ (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0).
have zero-correlation, where b and h denote any non-zero value.
Consider that the input masks (0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) will result that the
input mask for R2 is (e0, e1, ..., e14, e15) in the forward direction, where ei, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 denotes
a unknown value. The three bytes e3, e4, e10 satisfy that e3 ⊕ e4 ⊕ e10 = d5 6= 0. In the
backward direction, we can get that the input mask of R4 is (g0, g1, ..., g14, g15) from the
output (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0) where gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 also denotes a unknown
value. Then, we have g3 = 0, g4 = 0, g10 = 0, which leads that g3 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g10 = 0 and it
contradicts with d5 6= 0. As a result, the linear hull is a zero-correlation linear hull, see
7Figure 3: Key-recovery Attack on 6-Round ARIA
Figure 2. We also have the following 4-round linear approximations with zero-correlation,
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
4-Round−→ (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0);
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0)
4-Round−→ (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0);
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, b)
4-Round−→ (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0).
In addition, the linear map P of diffusion layer is a diagonal matrix. If we treat the
input/output masks as the input/output differentials, they are also 4-round impossible dif-
ferentials.
4 Key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA with Partial-Sum and FFT
In this section, based on the first 4-round zero-correlation linear approximates, we present
some key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA-128 with zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis.
In the attack process, the Partial-sum and FFT techniques are used to speed up, respectively.
4.1 Key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA with Partial-sum technique
To attack 6-round ARIA, the 4-round linear approximates with zero-correlation start from
round 2 and end at round 5. One round is added before and one round is appended after
the linear approximates, refer to Figure 3. The partial encryption and decryption using the
partial sum technique are proceeded as follows.
1. Allocate 40-bit counters V1[x1] for 2
88 possible values of x1 = m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m7[2,
5, 11, 12] and initialize them to zero. For the corresponding ciphertexts after 6 round encryp-
tion, extract the value of x1 and increment the corresponding counter V1[x1]. The time
complexity of this step is N memory accesses to process the chosen PC pairs. We assume
8Step Counter State Guess Complexity Computed States
3 m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m7[11, 12]|I12 k7[5] 288 × 216 I12 = I1 ⊕ S−16,5(m7[5]⊕ k7[5])
4 m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m7[12]|I13 k7[11] 280 × 224 I13 = I12 ⊕ S−16,11(m7[11]⊕ k7[11])
5 m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|I14 k7[12] 272 × 232 I14 = I13 ⊕ S−16,12(m7[12]⊕ k7[12])
6 m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|I14 |I21 k1[0] 264 × 240 I21 = S1,0(m1[0]⊕ k1[0])
7 m1[5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|I14 |I22 k1[2] 264 × 248 I22 = I21 ⊕ S1,2(m1[2]⊕ k1[2])
8 m1[8, 11, 14, 15]|I14 |I23 k1[5] 256 × 256 I23 = I22 ⊕ S1,5(m1[5]⊕ k1[5])
9 m1[11, 14, 15]|I14 |I24 k1[8] 248 × 264 I24 = I23 ⊕ S1,8(m1[8]⊕ k1[8])
10 m1[14, 15]|I14 |I25 k1[11] 240 × 272 I25 = I24 ⊕ S1,11(m1[11]⊕ k1[11])
11 m1[15]|I14 |I26 k1[14] 232 × 280 I26 = I25 ⊕ S1,14(m1[14]⊕ k1[14])
12 I14 |I27 k1[15] 224 × 288 I27 = I26 ⊕ S1,15(m1[15]⊕ k1[15])
Table 2: Partial Encryption and Decryption of the Attack on 6-Round ARIA-128
that processing each PC pair is equivalent to one round encryption, then the time complexity
of this step is about N × 1/6 6-round encryptions.
2. Allocate a counter V2[x2] for 2
80 possible values of x2 = m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m7[5, 11,
12]|I11 and initialize them to zero. Guess k7[2] and partially decrypt x1 to get the value of
x2, that is, compute I
1
1 = S
−1
6,2(m7[2] ⊕ k7[2]), then update the corresponding counter by
V2[x2]+ = V1[x1]. The computation is about 2
88 × 28 × 1/16× 1/6 6-round encryptions.
The following steps in the partial encryption and decryption phase are similar to Step
2, we use Table 2 to show the details of each partial encryption and decryption step. In
Table 2, the second column stands for the counters should be allocated in this step. The
subkey bytes that have to be guessed in each step are shown in the third column. the fourth
column denotes the time complexity of corresponding step measured in 1/16 × 1/6 6-round
encryption. The intermediate state values are shown in the last column.
13. Allocate a counter vector V [z] of size 216 where each element is 120-bit length for 16-bit
z (z is the concatenation of evaluations of 16 basis zero-correlation masks). For 216 values of
x12, evaluate all basis zero-correlation masks on V12 and put the evaluations to the vector z,
then add the corresponding V [z] : V [z]+ = V12[x12]. Compute T = N2
16
∑216−1
z=0 (
v[z]
N − 1216 ),
if T < τ , then the guessed key is a possible key candidate.
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7 and the type-II error proba-
bility β1 = 2
−90. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 11, n = 128, l = 216. According to Equation
(2) The date complex N is about 2123.6 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 215.9.
There are 88-bit key values guessed during the encryption phase, and only the right key
candidates survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of Step 3 to Step 12 is no
more than 2108.6 6-round ARIA encryptions and the complexity of Step 1 is about 2121 6-
round ARIA encryptions which is also the dominant part of our attack. In total, the data
complexity is about 2123.6 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2121 6-round ARIA
encryptions and the memory requirement are about 290.3 byte for counters.
94.2 Key-recovery attack on 6-round ARIA with FFT technique
Using the FFT technique, we can attack 6-round AIRA-128 starting from the first round by
placing the 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations in rounds 2 to 5. One round is
added before and one round is appended after the linear approximates, also see Figure 3.
In our attack, we guess the subkey and evaluate the linear approximation (0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0;
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ·m2 ⊕ (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0) ·m6 = 0, that is ,
u = b · (⊕i=0,2,5,8,11,14,15 S1,i(m1[i]⊕ k1[i]))⊕ h · (⊕i=2,5,11,12 S−16,i (m7[i]⊕ k7[i])⊕ k6[i]) = 0.
Let k6 = k6[2]⊕ k6[5]⊕ k6[11]⊕ k6[13] and v = u⊕ b · k6, then we have
v = b · (⊕i=0,2,5,8,11,14,15 S1,i(m1[i]⊕ k1[i]))⊕ h · (⊕i=2,5,11,12 S−16,i (m7[i]⊕ k7[i])) = 0. (3)
Our attack is equivalent to evaluating the correlation of the linear approximation v = 0.
The correlation of the linear approximation v = 0 can be evaluated as the matrix vector
product where the matrix is:
M(m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m7[2, 5, 11, 12]|k1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|k7[2, 5, 11, 12]) = (−1)v, (4)
see [13] and [18] for detail. Then the attack is performed as follows:
1. Allocate the vector of counters VK of the experimental correlation for every subkey
candidate K = k1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|k7[2, 5, 11, 12].
2. For each of N plaintext-ciphertext pairs, extract the 88-bit value i = m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14,
15]|m7[2, 5, 11, 12] and increment the counters xi according to the value of i.
3. For each of the 216 linear approximations,
(i). Perform the key counting phase and compute the first column of M using (3) and (4).
As M is a 88-level circulant matrix, this information is sufficient to define M completely ,
which requires 288 operations.
(ii). Evaluate the vector  = M · x, which requires about 3× 88× 288 operations.
(iii). Let W = W + (/N)2, If W < τ , then the corresponding K is a possible subkey
candidate and all master keys are tested exhaustively.
After Step 3, we obtain 288 counters VK which are the sum of squares of correlations for 2
16
linear approximations under each k. The correct subkey is then selected from the candidates
with VK less than the threshold τ If we set β0 = 2
−2.7 and β1 = 2−90, we get z1−β0 ≈ 1
and z1−β1 ≈ 11. Since the block size n = 128 and we have l = 216 linear approximations,
according to Equation (1), the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs N should be about
2124.1 and the threshold τ ≈ 2−108.4. In Step 3, only the right guess is expected to survive
for the 88-bit target subkey. The complexities for Step 2, Step 3, are 2121.5 memory accesses,
216 × 4 × 88 × 288 = 2112.5 operators, respectively. If we assume that one time of memory
access, one time of operators, one 6-round Camellia encryption are equivalent, then the total
time complexity is about 2121.5 encryptions. The memory requirements are about 290.3 bytes.
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Figure 4: Key-recovery Attack on 7-Round ARIA
5 Key-recovery attacks on 7-round ARIA with Partial-Sum and FFT
In this section, we describe some zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis of 7-round ARIA. The
attack is based on the first 4-round zero-correlation linear approximates with additional one
round in the begin and two rounds at the end, see Fig.4. Partial-Sum and FFT are also used
in the attack process, respectively.
5.1 Key-recovery attacks on 7-round ARIA with Partial-sum technique
Similarly to the attacks to 6-round ARIA, the partial encryption and decryption using the
partial sum technique are proceeded as follows.
1. Allocate 8-bit counters V1[x1] for 2
152 possible values of x1 = m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[1,
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] and initialize them to zero. For the corresponding ciphertexts
after 7 round encryption, extract the value of x1 and increment the corresponding counter
V1[x1]. The time complexity of this step is N memory accesses to process the chosen PC
pairs. We assume that processing each PC pair is equivalent to one round encryption, then
the time complexity of this step is about N × 1/7 7-round encryptions.
2. Allocate 8-bit counters V2[x2] for 2
120 possible values of x2 = m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[11,
12, 14, 15]|I11 |I21 |I51 |I111 |I121 and initialize them to zero. Guess k1[0],k8[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10] and
partially decrypt x1 to get the value of x2, that is, compute I
1
1 = S1,0(m1[0] ⊕ k1[0]), I21 =
⊕i=1,4,6,10S−17,i (m8[i]⊕k8[i]), I51 = ⊕i=1,3,4,9,10S−17,i (m8[i]⊕k8[i]), I111 = ⊕i=2,3,4,7,9S−17,i (m8[i]⊕
k8[i]), I
12
1 = ⊕i=1,2,6,7,9S−17,i (m8[i]⊕k8[i]), then update the corresponding counter by V2[x2]+ =
V1[x1]. The computation in this step is no more than N×272×1/16×1/7 7-round encryptions.
11
Step Counter State Guess Complexity Computed States
7 m1[5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|I12 |I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[2] 288 × 2112 I12 = I11 ⊕ S1,2(m1[2]⊕ k1[2])
8 m1[8, 11, 14, 15]|I13 |I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[5] 280 × 2120 I13 = I12 ⊕ S1,5(m1[5]⊕ k1[5])
9 m1[11, 14, 15]|I14 |I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[8] 272 × 2128 I14 = I13 ⊕ S1,8(m1[8]⊕ k1[8])
10 m1[14, 15]|I15 |I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[11] 264 × 2136 I15 = I14 ⊕ S1,11(m1[11]⊕ k1[11])
11 m1[15]|I16 |I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[14] 256 × 2144 I16 = I15 ⊕ S1,14(m1[14]⊕ k1[14])
12 I1|I24 |I53 |I113 |I123 k1[15] 248 × 2152 I1 = I16 ⊕ S1,15(m1[15]⊕ k1[15])
13 I1|I2|I53 |I113 |I123 k7,2 248 × 2160 I2 = S−16,2(I24 ⊕ k7,2)
14 I1|I5|I113 |I123 k7,5 240 × 2168 I5 = I2 ⊕ S−16,5(I53 ⊕ k7,5)
15 I1|I11|I123 k7,11 232 × 2176 I11 = I5 ⊕ S−16,11(I113 ⊕ k7,11)
16 I1|I12 k7,12 224 × 2184 I12 = I11 ⊕ S−16,12(I123 ⊕ k7,12)
Table 3: Partial Encryption and Decryption of the Attack on 7-Round ARIA
3. Allocate 8-bit counters V3[x3] for 2
112 possible values of x3 = m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[12,
14, 15]|I11 |I22 |I51 |I111 |I122 and initialize them to zero. Guess k8[11] and partially decrypt x2 to
get the value of x3, that is, compute I
2
2 = I
2
1⊕S−17,11(m8[11]⊕k8[11]), I122 = I121 ⊕S−17,11(m8[11]⊕
k8[11]), then update the corresponding counter by V3[x3]+ = V2[x2]. The computation in
this step is no more than 2120 × 280 × 1/16× 1/7 7-round encryptions.
4. Allocate 16-bit counters V4[x4] for 2
104 possible values of x4 = m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[14,
15]|I11 |I23 |I51 |I112 |I123 and initialize them to zero. Guess k8[12] and partially decrypt x3 to get
the value of x4, that is, compute I
2
3 = I
2
2 ⊕ S−17,12(m8[12]⊕ k8[12]), I112 = I111 ⊕ S−17,12(m8[12]⊕
k8[12]), I
12
3 = I
12
2 ⊕S−17,12(m8[12]⊕k8[12]), then update the corresponding counter by V4[x4]+ =
V3[x3]. The computation in this step is no more than 2
112×288×1/16×1/7 7-round encryp-
tions.
5. Allocate 24-bit counters V5[x5] for 2
96 possible values of x5 = m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[15]
|I11 |I23 |I51 |I112 |I123 and initialize them to zero. Guess k8[14] and partially decrypt x4 to get the
value of x5, that is, compute I
5
2 = I
5
1⊕S−17,14(m8[14]⊕k8[14]), I113 = I112 ⊕S−17,14(m8[14]⊕k8[14]),
then update the corresponding counter by V5[x5]+ = V4[x4]. The computation in this step is
no more than 2104 × 296 × 1/16× 1/7 7-round encryptions.
6. Allocate 32-bit counters V6[x6] for 2
88 possible values of x6 = m1[2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|I11
|I23 |I52 |I113 |I123 and initialize them to zero. Guess k8[15] and partially decrypt x5 to get the
value of x6, that is, compute I
2
4 = I
2
3 ⊕S−17,15(m8[15]⊕k8[15]), I53 = I52 ⊕S−17,15(m8[15]⊕k8[15]),
then update the corresponding counter by V6[x6]+ = V5[x5]. The computation in this step is
no more than 296 × 2104 × 1/16× 1/7 7-round encryptions.
Similarly, we use Table 3 to show the details of each partial encryption and decryp-
tion step, where we let k7,2 = ⊕i=1,4,6,10,11,12,15k7[i], k7,5 = ⊕i=1,3,4,9,10,14,15k7[i], k7,11 =
⊕i=2,3,4,7,9,12,14k7[i] and k7,12 = ⊕i=1,2,6,7,9,11,12k7[i]. After Step 13, we have reached the
boundaries of the zero-correlation linear approximations over 7-round ARIA. We then pro-
ceed the following steps to recover the right key.
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17. Allocate a counter vector V [z] of size 216 where each element is 120-bit length for 16-bit
z (z is the concatenation of evaluations of 16 basis zero-correlation masks). For 216 values of
x16, evaluate all basis zero-correlation masks on V16 and put the evaluations to the vector z,
then add the corresponding V [z] : V [z]+ = V16[x16]. Compute T = N2
16
∑216−1
z=0 (
v[z]
N − 1216 ),
if T < τ ,then the guessed key is a possible key candidate. We do exhaustive search for all
keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7 and the type-II error proba-
bility β1 = 2
−186. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 15.7, n = 128, l = 216. According to Equation
(2), the date complex N is about 2124.6 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 215.9.
There are 184-bit key values guessed during the encryption phase, and only the right key
candidates survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of Step 3 to Step 16 is no
more than 2203.5 7-round ARIA encryptions and In total, the data complexity is about 2124.6
known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2203.5 7-round ARIA encryptions and the
memory requirement are about 2152 byte for counters.
5.2 Key-recovery attack on 7-round ARIA with FFT technique
In our attack, one round is added before and two rounds are appended after the linear approx-
imates with zero-correlation from rounds 2 to 5, see Figure 4. We evaluate the linear approxi-
mations (0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)·m2⊕(0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0)·m6 =
0, that is ,
u = b · (⊕i=0,2,5,8,11,14,15 S1,i(m1[i]⊕K1[i]))⊕ h · (S−16,2(⊕i=1,4,6,10,11,12,15 (S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])
⊕k7[i]
))⊕ S−16,5(⊕i=1,3,4,9,10,14,15 (S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7[i]))
⊕ S−16,11
(⊕i=2,3,4,7,9,12,14 (S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7[i]))
⊕ S−16,12
(⊕i=1,2,6,7,9,11,12 (S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7[i]))
⊕ (k6[2]⊕ k6[5]⊕ k6[11]⊕ k6[12])
)
= 0.
Let K7,2 = ⊕i=0,2,5,8,11,14,15K7[i], K7,5 = ⊕i=1,4,6,10,11,12,15K7[i], K7,11 = ⊕i=1,3,4,9,10,14,15
K7[i], K7,12 = ⊕i=2,3,4,7,9,12,14K7[i], K6 = k6[2] ⊕ k6[5] ⊕ k6[11] ⊕ k6[12], and v = u ⊕ b ·K6,
then we have
v = b · (⊕i=1,6,8,10,13,15 S1,i(m1[i]⊕K1[i]))⊕ h · (S−16,2(⊕i=0,2,5,8,11,14,15 S−18,i (m7[i]
⊕K8[i])⊕K7,3
)⊕ S−16,5(⊕i=1,3,4,9,10,14,15S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7,5)
⊕ S−16,11(⊕i=2,3,4,7,9,12,14S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7,11)
⊕ S−16,12(⊕i=1,2,6,7,9,11,12S−17,i (m8[i]⊕ k8[i])⊕ k7,12)
)
= 0.
(5)
Our attack is equivalent to evaluating the correlation of the linear approximation v = 0,
which can be evaluated as the matrix vector product where the matrix is:
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M
(
m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m8[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15]|k1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]
|k8[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15]|k7,2|k7,5|k7,11|k7,12
)
= (−1)v. (6)
Then the attack is performed as follows:
1. Allocate the vector of counters VK of the experimental correlation for every subkey
candidate K = k1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|k8[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15]|k7,2|k7,5|k7,11|k7,12.
2. For each ofN plaintext-ciphertext pairs, extract the 8-bit value i = m1[0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]
|m8[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15], increment the counters xi according to the value of i.
3. For each of the 216 linear approximations,
(i). Perform the key counting phase and compute the first column of M using (5) and (6).
As M is a 184-level circulant matrix, this information is sufficient to define M completely ,
which requires 2184 operations.
(ii). Evaluate the vector  = M · x, which requires about 3× 184× 2184 operations.
(iii). Let W = W + (/N)2, If W < τ , then the corresponding K is a possible subkey
candidate and all master keys are tested exhaustively.
After Step 3, we obtain 2184 counters VK which are the sum of squares of correlations
for 216 linear approximations under each k. The correct subkey is then selected from the
candidates with VK less than the threshold τ If we set β0 = 2
−2.7 and β1 = 2−186, we get
z1−β0 ≈ 1 and z1−β1 ≈ 15.7. Since the block size n = 128 and we have l = 216 linear
approximations, according to Equation (1), the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs
N should be about 2124.7 and the threshold τ ≈ 2−108.4. In Step 3, only the right guess is
expected to survive for the 184-bit target subkey. The complexities for Step 2, Step 3, are
2121.9 memory accesses, 216 × 4 × 184 × 2184 = 2209.5 operators, respectively. If we assume
that one time of memory access, one time of operators, one 7-round Camellia encryption
are equivalent, then the total time complexity is about 2209.5 encryptions. The memory
requirements are about 2152 bytes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the security of ARIA block cipher with respect to the technique
of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. We deduce some 4-round zero-correlation linear ap-
proximations of ARIA, and based on those linear approximations, we give some key-recovery
attacks on 6/7 round ARIA-128/256 with the Partial-sum technique and FFT technique
taken into consideration. For the first time, we consider the security of ARIA against zero-
correlation linear cryptanalysis. While two techniques are used in the attack, it also gives us
a chance to compare the partial-sum technique and the FFT technique.
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